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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
STEPHEN ROBERT JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44994
Kootenai County Case No.
CR-2016-22597

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Jones failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed, upon his guilty
plea to felony eluding a police officer, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Jones Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Jones pled guilty to felony eluding a police officer, and the district court imposed a
unified sentence of five years, with three and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.53-54.) Jones filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.61-64.) He also filed a timely
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Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.

(Motion for

Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion
(Augmentation).)
Jones asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in light of his substance abuse, desire for treatment, mental health issues, support of
family and friends, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) Jones has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for felony eluding a police officer is five years. I.C. §§
49-1404(2), 18-112. The district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three and
one-half years fixed, which falls within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.53-54.) Jones’ sentence
is not excessive in light of his ongoing criminal thinking and his failure to rehabilitate while in
the community.
Jones’ criminal record started when he was just 12 years old when he was arrested for
petit theft, and has continued throughout his life. (PSI, pp.5-15.) Over time he has acquired six
felony convictions and 27 misdemeanor convictions, has been on probation “four or five times,”
has completed three retained jurisdiction programs, and has been incarcerated twice. (PSI,
pp.14-15.) Jones did not do well on probation, as he admitted violating the conditions of his
release by absconding, drinking, and associating with other felons. (PSI, pp.14-15.) He also did
not do well while incarcerated, admitting he received disciplinary actions for “about four” fights,
two of which he instigated because he “lost [his] cool.” (PSI, p.15.) Jones was released from
prison in September 2016. (PSI, p.14.) Just two months later – and despite the multitude of
prior legal sanctions, opportunities on probation, rehabilitative programs and outpatient treatment
opportunities he received – Jones chose to endanger the community by driving the wrong way on
a highway, failing to stop when an officer activated his emergency lights and siren, and striking
another vehicle. (PSI, pp.4-15, 21.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Jones’ sentence. (3/3/17 Tr., p.34, L.15 –
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p.36, L.1 (Appendix A).) The state submits that Jones has failed to establish that his sentence is
excessive for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Jones next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he has not been able to start programming.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.) If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews the denial of
the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840
(2007). To prevail on appeal, Jones must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35
motion.” Id. Jones has failed to satisfy his burden.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Jones merely stated that he was unable to immediately
access programming because his fixed time is too long and offenders closer to parole eligibility
are given priority. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8) Jones’ complaint that he cannot participate in
treatment until he nears completion of the determinate portion of his sentence is not new
information that entitles him to a reduction of sentence. The district court was aware, at the time
of sentencing, of Jones’ desire to participate in programming, and it is not “new” information
that prisoners are most often placed in such treatment nearer to their date of parole eligibility.
(PSI, p.37.) Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more properly
framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act.” State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion). Because Jones presented no
new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his
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sentence is excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis
for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
In denying Jones’ Rule 35 motion, the district court noted that “Mr. Jones has been on
three previous riders, that this was his seventh felony, and there were some 28 misdemeanors.”
(7/7/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-18.) The district court considered all of the relevant information and
appropriately concluded that Jones’ sentence “was fair and just in this matter.” (7/7/17 Tr., p.11,
Ls.19-20.) Jones has not shown that he was entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he
has not been able to begin any kind of programming. Given any reasonable view of the facts,
Jones has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Jones’ conviction and sentence and the
district court’s order denying Jones’ Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 20th day of November, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

35

33
1

driving.

2

1
They tried to pull me over. I crashed Into a

lhla caaa.

2

The Cour1 then looks to rehabilitation. The
that yolive ~ on three riders before, that

3

ditch. After crashing Into that dttch, that's klnd of

4

where I came to, where, you know, I rolled off the curb.

3
4

S

Before I could ha the brakes, I bumped into a truck

5

count. There's 28 misdemeanors In Ihle caN. And the

6

that waa In front of me meybe at like 5 mUea an hour.

6

Court has trouble finding you to be aubject to

7

rehab!lllatlon based upon your whole record.

I, in no way, want to minimize anything that

7
8

happened that njght. I want to sit here today and I

8

9

want to take accountability for wt happened. and I

9

lhia la your seventh felony pursuant to your counsel's

The Court also looks at the deterrent faciora,
the fact that you need to be detened from this action

10 as well as aocleCy, And the Court looks a1 what to do

10 want to make the steps necessary to change that.
The Geneals process, the Alliance, NA. paying

11

Court -

11 v.ilh a ae'lell-time felon who's been on three riders. And

12 restitlJUon, paying my fines, paying it back to society,

12 finally, the Court looka at punishment, which, over a

13 that's lltlo I am. Thal's what I want to do. That's - I

13 penod ct time and your record, this case requires soma

14 just - I beg of you to give me an opportunity on

14 punishment.

15 probation and to show you that I can do It. and thara,

15

16 you know, tha best thing for me at this time. Thank

18 aentencing you lo - on the charge of eluding a police

17 you, your Honor. I apologize that I took so long,

17 officer, to a aantenai of three and a halfyeara filled

18 but...

18 plus one and a half years Indeterminate fot a unified

19

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Jones. The Court's

19 sentence of five yeara.

20 reviewed the PSI and the Court flnda that the defendant

20

21

21

had an opportunity lo read the PSI and discuss it with

22 counsel and make any changes thereto. The Court flnda

Taking that all ln1o account, the Court is

And, Mr. Jones, the Court is compelled to
in,pose that sentence. Having been recently releaaed

22 from prison, you would have thought that you would have

23 the defendant had 811 opportunity to make a statement to

23 taken a dlffetent track and not been uaing In lhla caae.

24 the Cour1 end has done so.

24 And the Court takea no joy In there. There Is nevec any

25

25 joy In aending somebody to prison, but the Court's

The Court's considered the recommendations of

34
1

the prosecuting attorney, thoae cootained in the PSI,
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1

oompeUed to do so.

2

and those of defenae counsel. 11 there any legal reason

2

3

why judgment and sentence should not be pronounced at

3

Influence. I'm going to simply sentence you for 98 days

4

thistime?

As to the charge of - the dtivfng under the

4

and give you credrt for 98 days, and I wil suspend your

5

MS, McCLINTON: No, your Honor.

5

driver's ticense for the period of 90 daya beginning

8

MR. NAFTZ: No, your Honor.

6

today.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, tt Is hereby ordered

7

8

and It Is the judgment of this Court that after you have

9

been advised of and waived your conatttutlonal rights to

10 trial by Jury, to remain silent. to confront witnaaaea,

8

/vJ far as any restitution, you say you don't

have thoaa figures?
MS. McCLINTON: I don't, Judge. Ill could

9

10 have 80 days.

11 and having pied guilty to the aimes of driving under

11

12 the influence, In this Instance a misdemeanor, and the

12 of 80 days.

13 charge of eluding of a police officer, that thla Court

13

MS. McCLINTON: Thank you.

14 finds you guity of thoae crimes.

14

THE COURT: Mr. Jonea, I hope you can get some

15

Mr. Jones, you heard me talk earlier today

THE COURT: We'll keep that open for a period

15 help this time around. You're remanded to the custody

16 about the factors of aantllllClng, the first being

18 of the sheriff to await transportation to the Department

17 protectlon of society. And the Court looke al your

17 of Corrections. Anything further In this matter,

18 record, the Court looka at the tact of that you've had

18 Mr. Naftz?

19 three rldera, and it's a huge factor of p,otec:ting

19

20 society. You were driving on the wrong side of the road

20 Thank you.

21

In the dark of night; la that correct?

22

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

23

THE COURT: Okay. That somebody could have -

MR. NAFTZ: Nothing funher, your Honor.

21

THE COURT: Ma. McCllnton?

22

MS. McCLINTON: No, your Honor. Thank you.

23

24 I'm - 81 weMas tm sure you are and the victims io

24

25 this case, I'm glad that there are no other victims In

25

(Metter adjoumed.)

